The Battle of Rathmines and Baggotrath

CHAPTER XVIII

The most notable event in the annals of Rathmines was the battle in 1649, during the Civil War between the Royalists and the Parliamentarians. Dublin was then a small city - much smaller, indeed than the Rathmines Township at the present day - and, if we take Speed’s *Map *of 1610 as a guide, may be said to have been almost wholly comprised within a boundary drawn as follows: - Bow Street, St. Michan’s Church, Mary’s Abbey, and thence obliquely across the river to the College, Grafton Street, Peter Street, St. Patrick’s Cathedral, Francis Street, Thomas Street, and James’s Street.

In those days Rathmines was far out in the country, laid out in fields, pastures and tillage lands, with perhaps occasional waste patches covered by furze or bracken. There does not appear to have been any village there at the time, and we may suppose the district between Rathmines Castle and the city to have been interspersed with cottages and farm houses adjoining the two highways now known as the Rathmines and Ranelagh roads. Viewed across the open country to the southward was an unbroken panorama of the mountains, which, however, peaceful looking, were full of menace to the lowlands, owing to the spoils exacted by the “mountainy men in their frequent raids upon the fertile tract lying between them and the metropolis.

The roads which traversed the district in which the battle was fought coincided almost exactly with the modem routes from the city through the following localities: - (1) Portobello, Rathmines, Upper Rathmines, Dartry Road, Milltown; (2) Charlotte Street, Charlemont Street, Ranelagh, Clonskeagh; (3) Stephen’s Green, Lower and Upper Leeson Street, Morehampton Road, Donnybrook; (4) Stephen’s Green, Baggot Street, Pembroke Road, Ballsbridge, Merrion. Besides these there was a path or track diverging from Rathmines Road, following the route of the present Mountpleasant Avenue, Palmerston Road, and the foot passages therefrom, *via *Richmond Avenue to Militown Station and Militown. This old field-path survived in part up to about forty years ago, and is still remembered by many.

Routes (1) and (2) diverged at the place formerly known as “The Bleeding Horse,” from an old inn that stood at the junction of Charlotte Street and Camden Street.

These routes will be found tolerably well marked in Petty’s *Maps of the Down Survey (circa 1650), *and Rocque’s *Maps of Dublin and its Environs (1756, *&c.). Although the survey for Rocque’s *Map *was made about 100 years after the battle, there is no reason to suppose that any great alteration had taken place in the main roads during that interval.

No cross roads are marked in either of these maps, and communication between the main thoroughfares was probably by means of rough lanes and tracks across the fields, used principally by farmers and others residing in the district. An allusion to these lanes is to be found in a letter written by Sir James Dyve, a Royalist, who fought in the battle, to the Marquess of Newcastle, in which it is stated that the only way of reaching the camp at Rathmines from the city was by a number of “avenues.”

When the Marquess of Ormonde, as Commander in Chief of the Royalist Army in Ireland, took the field in 1649, Dublin was held by a Parliamentary garrison under command of Colonel Jones, a skilled and experienced officer. Naturally the metropolis was the first place which Ormonde selected for attack, and with that object he marched from Kilkenny, reaching Castleknock on the 21st June, and moving next day to Finglas, from which he carried on some desultory operations against the north side of the city. According to a statement in a letter to King Charles II., written by Ormonde after his defeat, the total forces which he had at his disposal for the investment of Dublin, numbered 28,000 horse and foot. But, in the First Appendix to Walsh’s *Irish Remonstrance, *&c., Ormonde mentions that after the defeat he sent word to the portion of his army at Finglas to retreat to Drogheda and Trim, from which it would appear that his entire forces were not engaged in this action. He also states that his army “encamped at Rathmines” was not more numerous than that of Jones, and Ludlow in his *Memoirs *estimates the strength of Jones’s force engaged to have been between 4,000 and 5,000.

The city was then in a very unfit state to sustain a prolonged siege - it was not properly fortified, and the garrison was in serious straits for provisions, besides being much inferior in point of numbers and equipment to the total forces of their adversaries. One of the officers of the garrison, in a letter written to his brother in London, states that wheat was selling at £5 10s. a quarter (504 lbs.), rye at £4 10s. a quarter (480 lbs.), and cheese at 9d. a pound; and he adds that there was a great scarcity of provisions even at those prices, and less money wherewith to buy them. It should be remembered that money was then some four or five times its present value. This officer estimated the strength of the garrison at about 7,500, including the inhabitants (he probably meant those bearing arms), and that of the besiegers at about 10,000.

Ormonde may have been unaware of the serious plight of the city; indeed it is difficult otherwise to explain his prolonged inactivity which allowed time for supplies and reinforcements to be sent from England, and enabled the beleaguered garrison to strengthen their fortifications. Whatever may have been his reasons, however, he took no decisive steps until the close of July, when he marched to Rathmines and encamped somewhere on the high ground lying between the localities now known as Palmerstown Park and Ranelagh. He then cut off the water supply - *i.e., *the old city watercourse which starts from the Dodder at the weir of Firhouse - thereby further increasing the straits of the city by depriving it of drinking water and stopping its corn mills. (Gones’s letter to the Council of State, and Ormonde’s letter to Charles II.)

On the 27th July a Council of War was held by Ormonde in his camp at Rathmines, as a result of which Rathfarnham castle, held by a small force of Parliamentarians, was, next day, taken, the garrison offering little or no resistance. Another Council of War was held on 1St August, and it was there decided to fortify the old castle of Baggotrath, standing on the ground now covered by the houses 44 and 46 Upper Baggot Street, opposite Waterloo Road, with the object of preventing the besieged garrison from grazing their horses on the pasture lands lying between Baggotrath and the city.

This would, it was thought, in a short time deprive the garrison of the use of their cavalry, and greatly hamper them in their operations. As the sequel shows, however, Ormonde had waited too long, the beleaguered force having now been relieved by the arrival of several vessels from England bringing reinforcements of cavalry and infantry, as well as considerable supplies of arms and ammunition.

On 1st August, in pursuance of the decision arrived at, Major-General Purcell was sent after dark with 1,500 men to fortify Baggotrath Castle, little over a mile distant, but as there was no direct route, he had to seek the aid of guides.

At daybreak on the 2nd August, Ormonde rode over to Baggotrath to ascertain how the work of fortification had proceeded, but, to his surprise found that very little progress had been made, and that Jones had forestalled him by dismantling the castle, leaving it in such a condition that it was scarcely worth fortifying. On demanding an explanation of the delay, Purcell informed Ormonde that the party had arrived there only an hour before daybreak, having been treacherously misled by the guides, and, seeing that the distance was so short, it would seem that treachery was at work somewhere.

When Jones recognised the object of the besiegers’ movements near the castle, he considered the risk of delay so great that he determined to strike at once, and with that object deployed a large force of cavalry and infantry behind his fortifications at Lowsy Hill, now Townsend Street. Ormonde, observing this movement, drafted the bulk of his troops over towards Baggotrath, planted some artillery on Gallows Hill (now Mount Street), and issued orders to the whole army to prepare for action. He then assigned posts to his commanding officers5 and, having been up all the previous night writing despatches, rode back to his camp, which he reached about 9 o’clock, to take some rest, in order that he might be ready for the action which he expected that day. (Ormonde’s letters to King Charles II.)

Meanwhile Jones, by making the utmost haste with his preparations, was enabled to commence his advance by 9 o’clock, and about an hour later, suddenly attacked and utterly routed the right wing of Ormonde’s army at the castle, some of the fugitives flying towards the main body and others towards the mountains; Ormonde, awakened by firing, which as he states himself, he judged to be much nearer than Baggotrath, rushed from his tent, but before he could even mount his horse, learned that his men had been beaten out of Baggotrath, that Sir William Vaughan had been killed, and the cavalry under his command who were supporting the operations at the castle, routed. This body of cavalry, Sir Lewis Dyve in his letter states, had been stationed “upon a large plowed field looking towards the Castle of Dublin.”

The portion of the army nearer to Ormonde’s camp, except the two regiments commanded by his brother and Colonel Reilly, became demoralised when they saw the others in retreat, and ran away without even facing the enemy, notwithstanding the efforts of Ormonde and his officers to rally them, and the Parliamentary troops gained field after field until at last they reached the artillery. Here Ormonde with the regiments mentioned, together with a force of infantry under Colonel Gifford appears to have made a last desperate stand, facing the Parliamentarians as they came out from the city, when a party of Jones’s cavalry that had got on the Milltown path or road, by riding round or crossing the country unobserved, attacked them in the rear, while a further body of infantry advanced against them in front, and then, to use Ormonde’s own words “Some called for quarter, some threw away their arms and some continued shooting. Then we quit the field, and endeavoured (but in vain) several times to rally the horse.” He adds that he followed the cavalry for twelve miles in the hope of checking their retreat. (Walsh’s *Irish Remonstrance, *1st Appendix, p.111.) He then felt that he had no alternative but to make good his escape westward, leaving his artillery, ammunition and treasure in the hands of the enemy. During the engagement he was struck by a musket ball, but the superior quality of his armour saved him from injury.

In one of Ormonde’s letters to the King, in which he almost claims the victory, he mentions the fact that his men were greatly agitated by the rumour that Cromwell had landed in Dublin, although he (Ormonde) knew that the story was baseless, and had been circulated with the object of demoralising his men.

Jones, in his despatch dated 11th August, 1649, reporting the result to the Council of State, gives a detailed list of the artillery and prisoners captured in the baffle, and states that the engagement lasted two hours. Among the prisoners mentioned are:-

“William Cunningham, a noted rebel.” [Each party called the other rebels in this war.]

“Mr. Baggot, Deputy Paymaster.

“Mr. John Herbert, servant to the pretended King, who landed at Galway about six days since with the King’s household goods.”

Two of the cannon captured are described as follows: -

“One square brass demi-culverin, weighing 2,800 pounds, her length 11 feet four inches, her bullet weighing 12 pounds.”

“One brass mortar piece, weighing 920 seven pounds, her shell weighing 100 pounds.”

Owing to exaggeration and misrepresentation on both sides it is not easy to form an accurate estimate of the number killed - it was probably between 1,000 and 1,500*.*

A number of the Royalist troops under Lord Inchiquin’s command, who had taken refuge in the castles of Rathmines and Rathgar, surrendered on being offered quarter, and “promising faithfulness,” took up arms in the Parliamentary service. (Jones’s letter to the Council of State.) Of this incident, Ludlow gives the following account in his *Memozrs: - *“Colonel Jones pursued him [Ormonde] close, finding little opposition, except from a party of Lord Inchiquin’s horse that had formerly served the Parliament, who defended a pass *[i.e., *a passage] for some time, but were after some dispute broken and forced to fly. Having routed these, he marched with all diligence up to the walls of Rathmines [Castle], which were about 16 feet high, and containing about 10 acres of ground, where many of the enemy’s foot had shut up themselves; but perceiving their army to be entirely routed, and their General fled, they yielded themselves prisoners. After this, our men continued their pursuit, found a party of about 2,000 foot of the Lord Inchiquin’s, in a grove belonging to Rathgar [Castle], who after some defence, obtained conditions for their lives; and the next day most of them took up arms in our service.”

As stated in the preceding chapter, the castle of Rathmines stood on the site now occupied by the house known as “The Orchards,” Palmerston Park, and that of Rathgar, on the ground immediately adjoining the top of the modern Rathgar Road and the beginning of the Orwell Road.

The principal grounds for supposing the site of Ormonde’s camp to have been between Palmerston Park and Ranelagh are - (1) the statements of both parties that he encamped at Rathmines, and (2) that his camp was a mile (Irish measure) from Baggotrath Castle. *(Irish Remonstrance, *Sir Lewis Dyve’s letter, &c., &c.) No mention is made on old maps or elsewhere, of the existence of any village at Rathmines at time, and the statement that he encamped “at Rathmines” would probably mean that his camp was somewhere in the I neighbourhood of the castle which was then the most important ft object in the district. Now the highest ground fulfilling the conditions (1) and (2) is that immediately east of Palmerston Road, from time immemorial known as “The Bloody Fields,” which would naturally be selected by Ormonde as commanding the best view – possibly extending to Baggotrath castle itself, as there were then no buildings intervening.

The name “The Bloody Fields” would at first sight appear to to suggest that this must be the scene of portion of the conflict, but as the massacre of the Bristolian settlers in 1209 occurred in the same locality, it cannot with certainty be stated to which event this name is attributable.

These fields, now nearly built over, would be the most probable place where numbers of the fugitives in their flight to Rathmines and Rathgar Castles were overtaken and slain by Jones’s cavalry, the dead bodies afterwards being buried where they fell by the peasantry of the neighbourhood.

Sir Lewis Dyve, in his letter to the Marquess of Newcastle, states that no effort was made to defend the lanes leading from Baggotrath to Ormonde’s camp, although they could have been held with little risk or difficulty, and that, owing to treachery, some of these lanes had been purposely left open and unguarded for the convenience of Jones’s soldiers.

The manner in which Ormonde kept his camp is thus alluded to in the ninth article of “The Declaration of Jamestown,” in Walsh’s *Irish Remonstrance:

*“Nothing happened in Christianity more shameful than the disaster at Rathmines near Dublin, where His Excellency, as it seemed … kept rather a Mart of Wares, a Tribunal of Pleadings, or a great Inne of play, drinking and pleasure, than a great camp of soldiers.”

The conclusion to be drawn from a perusual of all the correspondence and narratives in connection with this battle is that from the outset the result was a foregone conclusion, Jones’s forces being well disciplined and skilfully handled, while those of Ormonde’s were honeycombed with treachery and dissension, commanded by inexperienced officers, and lacked the cohesion and enthusiasm essential to success. There even seems to have been a suspicion that the Confederation of Kilkenny, with which Ormonde was then co-operating, was desirous that he should not achieve too great a success, and that this was the explanation of the many acts of treachery that came to light in connection with this engagement. It should also be remembered that a large portion of Ormonde’s army must have been composed of men who had fought against him in the Insurrection of 1641-2.

The victory of the Parliamentarians was complete and decisive; it broke up the Royalist army and raised the siege of Dublin. Ormonde abandoned all hope when Cromwell landed in Dublin a fortnight later, and the following year retired to the Continent where he remained until the Restoration.

The following authorities have been consulted in the preparation of this chapter: - Dr. Elrington Ball’s *History of the County of Dublin; *Dalton’s *History of the County Dublin; *Carte’s *Life of Ormonde; *Ludlow’s *Memoirs; *Walsh’s *Irish Remonstrance, *&c.; Ormonde’s two letters to King Charles II., written after the battle; Colonel Jones’s letter to the Council of State of 11th August, 1649; Two letters from a Colonel in Dublin during the siege to his brother, a merchant in London, and other tracts in the Thorpe Collection.

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