Life of Lord Chancellor Sir Richard Cox - continued.

Chapter XXXIII.

Conclusion of the life of Lord Chancellor** Sir Richard Cox.**

In 1701, Sir Richard, as already mentioned, was advanced in judicial dignity as successor to Chief-Justice Hely, who died at Ennis, April *7, *1701, while he, with Sir Richard Cox, were the Judges going the Munster Circuit. On this sad event taking place, Mr. Justice Cox finished the circuit alone. In the following month he was sworn in Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, and member of the Privy Council.

One of his daughters married at this time. The marriage was not fortunate, as recorded in his diary:- ‘On the 15th day of June my daughter Mary marryed Mr. Allen Rigg, which had a good prospect, but proved an unfortunate match.’ The Chief Justicehip of the Common Pleas, with the duties of which Sir Richard’s seat as a *puisne *judge made him familiar, was an easy post for him. He records in his autobiography, with much satisfaction, his pleasant circuits round Leinster, Munster, and Connaught; and while holding assizes on the last-named circuit, in the spring of 1702, he received a letter from Daniel Finch, Earl of Nottingham, informing him ‘that Queen Anne, [Queen Anne succeeded William III. March 8, 1702.] having under her consideration many matters relating to Ireland, in which he might be useful to her service, had commanded him to write that he (Cox) should go to London as soon as conveniently he could, that she might have his advice.’ Accordingly he set sail on the 10th of April, and whilst he attended the Queen his opinion was taken on all matters; but especially, first, as to the most convenient time for the sitting of Parliament; second, which manufacture, linen or woollen, would be *most for the interest of England to encourage in Ireland.’ *

He recommended, with reference to the first, ‘that the meeting of Parliament should be postponed as long as possible;’ and, as to the second point, ‘he was clearly of opinion that it was for the interest of England to encourage the woollen manufacturers in Ireland, in the coarse branches of it, which would prevent the wool and the manufacturers from being carried to France, and would not interfere with the manufacturers of England. He thought it the most impolitic step ever taken by England to prohibit the whole exportation of woollen manufactures from Ireland, and showed clearly that a very grave mistake had been committed, which caused Lord Godoiphin to declare, “that they were convinced all he said was true; but they had the strong prejudice of the people to deal with, who looked on the increase of the woollen manufacture in Ireland with so jealous an eye, that they would not listen to the most reasonable arguments in its favour; and that they compelled the late King and his ministers to comply with their wishes against their own judgments. That nothing could change them but their own sufferings, which could not come so quickly as that he could expect to see the alteration.’ But whenever they shall feel the mischievous consequences of what they had so rashly done, he ventured to prophesy that they will attribute them to any causes, however improbable, rather than confess the necessity of admitting their brethren in Ireland into any share of their trade, and will try a thousand expedients before they will put into execution the natural, and therefore the only one which can be effectual, and which France would give millions of money to prevent taking place.”’ [Harris’s Life of Cox, p. 22.] Although the English minister could not follow the advice of Sir Richard, they were sensible of its value, and the Queen presented him with 500l. to defray the expenses of his journey in obedience to her request.

During his stay in London there were rumours that Lord Chancellor Methuen was about to relinquish the Great Seal of Ireland, and Sir Richard Cox was sounded as to his wishes to be made Lord Chancellor. Having a thorough knowledge of Irish affairs, he was not desirous of exchanging the safe haven of the Common Pleas Bench for the more profitable, but less secure, moorings of the Chancery. He lost his old patron, King William III., who had raised him from an humble station to high office, and whose personal knowledge of his integrity and devotion to his true interest had protected him from the rude attacks of party malignity. His ever zealous and watchful friend, Sir Robert Southwell, was also dead, and the consciousness that the station he then filled was the best for his quiet and ease, made him unwilling to exchange it for an office which be might not retain for a year, through the violence of parties at both sides of the channel. As, however, the Queen was desirous Sir Richard should accept the custody of the Great Seal, when Mr. Methuen resigned the Lord Chancellorship of Ireland to become Ambassador to Portugal, he signified his desire to submit to the will of the Queen, and in July 1703 he was nominated to this high dignity at the Privy Council of England. It was very gratifying to him that every Privy Councillor present, acquainted with Ireland, either having been employed in its government, or natives of the kingdom, or possessed of estates there, expressed their warm approval of the Queen’s selection. On August 6th he was sworn into office, and on the 10th of that month writs issued for the assembling of a Parliament in Dublin. [Harris’s Life of Cox, p. 22.]

Parliament met on December 24, 1703, and although we learn it was a very busy and critical session, and that various attempts were made to confound and expose the Chancellor to ridicule, yet he discharged himself so satisfactorily that Archbishop Vesey, who had sat long in that House, and was universally known to be a competent judge, said, ‘That no person in his time guided the debates of that House with so much readiness, impartiality, and dignity as Sir Richard Cox.’

The subjects dealt with in this session were principally dictated by animosity against Roman Catholics. The Lords had no sooner assembled, and the Lord Chancellor, as Speaker, taken his seat on the Woolsack, than the following entry was made in the Lords’ Journal:- ‘Ordered, on motion, that the Bill intituled “An Act to prevent Popish Priests from coining into this Kingdom,” be read the first time.’

The Lord Chancellor procured some salutary laws to be enacted. One for ‘the Recovery of Small Debts in a summary way.’ This Act proved of great benefit to small traders. But No-Popery legislation occupied most of the time of the Irish Parliament. In a bill sent from England, the clause, called ‘The Sacramental Test,’ was inserted, providing ‘that all persons having any office, civil or military (including corporate offices), shall be obliged to take the oaths, and to receive the sacrament, according to the usage of the Church of Ireland, and in default of so doing the office to be void, and whoever shall continue to act in such office, having neglected to qualify himself; shall incur the penalties imposed by the Test Act.’

On this bill being brought before the Lords, on February 28, 1703, it was ordered, ‘that Counsel appointed to attend at the bar of the house on the petition of Nicholas Lord Viscount Kingsland, Richard Lord Beliew, Colonel John Brown, Colonel Thomas Burke, Colonel Robert Nugent, Captain Arthur French, and other Roman Catholics of Ireland, and persons comprised within the Articles of Limerick and Galway, be heard what they have to offer against the Engrossed Bill sent up by the Commons, entitled, “An Act to prevent the further growth of Popery.” [Lords’ Jour. Ir., vol. ii. p. 73.]

The learned Counsel were Sir Theobald Butler, Richard. Malone, and Sir Stephen Rice; the first to in their gowns, the third without a gown, as he appealed not for the petitioners in general, but for himself in his private capacity, as one of the aggrieved persons. It is to be observed that these Catholic lawyers were themselves ‘protected persons,’ within the meaning of the Articles of Limerick; and that they were pleading on that day not only for their clients, but for themselves - for their own liberty to plead in court and to wear their gowns. It was a very remarkable scene; and I insert here part of the argument of Sir Theobald Butler. [It is fully reported in Plowden’s Appendix and in Curry’sHistorical Review.] The speaker opens by quoting the Articles of Limerick; he proceeds:-

‘That since the said Articles were thus under the most solemn ties, and for such valuable considerations granted the petitioners, by nothing less than the General of the Army, the Lords Justices of the Kingdom, the King, Queen, and Parliament, the public faith of the nation was therein concerned, obliged, bound, and engaged, as fully and firmly as was possible for one people to pledge faith to another; that therefore this Parliament could not pass such a bill as that intituled “An Act to prevent’ the further growth of Popery,” then. before the House, into a law, without infringing those Articles, and a manifest breach of the public faith; of which he hoped that House would be no less regardful and tender than their predecessors who made the Act for confirming those Articles had been.

‘That if he proved that the passing that Act was such a manifest breach of those Articles, and consequently of the public faith, he hoped that honourable House would be very tender how they passed the said Bill before them into a law; to the apparent prejudice of the petitioners, and the hazard of bringing upon themselves and posterity such evils, reproach, and infamy, as the doing the like had brought upon other nations and people.

‘Now, that the passing such a Bill as that then before the House to prevent *the further growth of Popery *will be a breach of those Articles, and consequently of the public faith, I prove (said he) by the following argument:-

‘The argument then is, whatever shall be enacted to the prejudice or destroying of any obligation, covenant, or contract, in the most solemn manner, and for the most valuable consideration entered into, is a manifest violation and destruction of every such obligation, covenant, and contract: but the passing that Bill into a law will evidently and absolutely destroy the Articles of Limerick and Galway, to all intents and purposes, and therefore the passing that Bill into a law will be such a breach of those Articles, and consequently of the public faith, plighted for performing those Articles; which remained to be proved.

‘The major is proved, for that whatever destroys or violates any contract, or obligation, upon the most valuable considerations, most solemnly made and entered into, destroys and violates the end of every such contract or obligation: but the end and design of those Articles was, that all those therein comprised, and every of their heirs, should hold, possess, and enjoy all and every of their estates of freehold and inheritance, and all their rights, titles, and interests, privileges, and immunities, which they and every of them held, enjoyed, or were rightfully entitled to, in the reign of King Charles the Second; or at any time since, by the laws and statutes that were in force in the said reign in this realm: but that the design of this bill was to take away every such right, title, interest, &c., from every father being a Papist, and to make the Popish father, who, by the Articles and laws aforesaid, had an undoubted right either to sell or otherwise at pleasure to dispose of his estate, at any time of his life as he thought fit only tenant for life: and consequently disabled from selling, or otherwise disposing thereof, after his son or other heir should become Protestant, though otherwise never so disobedient, profligate, or extravagant: *ergo, *this Act tends to the destroying the end for which those Articles were made, and consequently the breaking of the public faith, plighted for their performance.

‘The minor is proved by the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 15th, 16th, and 17th clauses of the said Bill, all which (said he) I shall consider and speak to, in the order as they are placed in the Bill.

‘By the first of these clauses (which is the third of the Bill), I that am the Popish father, without committing any crime against the State, or the laws of the land (by which only I ought to be governed), or any other fault; but merely for being of the religion of my forefathers, and that which, till of late years, was the ancient religion of these kingdoms, contrary to the express words of the Second Article of Limerick, and the public faith, plighted as aforesaid for their performance, am deprived of my inheritance, freehold, &c., and of all other advantages which by those Articles and the laws of the land I am entitled to enjoy, equally with every other of my fellow-subjects, whether Protestant or Popish. And though such my estate be even the purchase of my own hard labour and industry, yet I shall not (though my occasions be never so pressing) have liberty (after my eldest son or other heir becomes a Protestant) to sell, mortgage, or otherwise dispose of, or charge it for payment of my debts, or have leave out of my own estate to order portions for my other children; or leave a legacy, though never so small, to my poor father or mother, or other poor relations; but during my own life my estate shall be given to my son or other heir, being a Protestant, though never so undutiful, profligate, extravagant, or otherwise undeserving; and I that am the purchasing father, shall become tenant for life only to my own purchase, inheritance and freehold, which I purchased with my own money; and such my son or other heir, by this Act, shall be at liberty to sell or otherwise at pleasure to dispose of my estate, the sweat of my brows, before my face; and I that am the purchaser, shall not have liberty to raise one farthing upon the estate of my own purchase, either to pay my debts, or portion my daughters (if any I have), or make provisions, for my other male children, though never so deserving and dutiful: but my estate, and the issues and profits of it, shall, before my face, be at the disposal of another, who cannot possibly know how to distinguish between the dutiful and undutiful, deserving and undeserving. Is not this, gentlemen, a hard case? I be-seech you, gentlemen, to consider, whether you would not think it so, if the scale was changed, and the case your own, as it is to be ours, if this Bill pass into a law.

‘It is natural for the father to love the child; but we all know that children are but too apt and subject, without any such liberty as that Bill gives, to slight and neglect their duty to their parents; and surely such an Act as this will not be an instrument of restraint, but rather encourage them more to it.

‘It is but too common with the son who has a prospect of an estate, when once he arrives at the age of one-and-twenty, to think the old father too long in the way between him and it; and how much more will he he subject to it, when by this Act he shall have liberty, before he comes to that age, to compel and force my estate from me, without asking my leave, or being liable to account with me for it, or out of his share thereof, to a moiety of the debts, portions, or other incumbrances, with which the estate might have been charged, before the passing this Act.

‘Is not this against the laws of God and man; against the rules of reason and justice, by which all men ought to be governed? Is not this the only way in the world to make children become undutiful, and to bring the gray head of the parent to the grave with grief and tears?’

Having concluded his argument against the clause affecting Catholics, Sir Theobaid Butler directed the attention of the House to ‘the evils which the Bill imposed upon Protestant Dissenters.

‘The 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, and 14th clauses of this Bill relate to offices and employments which the Papists of Ireland cannot hope for enjoyment of, otherwise than by grace and favour extraordinary: and, therefore, do not so much affect them as the Protestant Dissenters; who (if this Bill pass into a law) are equally with the Papists deprived of bearing any office, civil or military, under the Government, to which, by right of birth and the laws of the land, they are as indisputably entitled, as any other their Protestant brethren; and if what the Irish did in the late disorders of this kingdom made them rebels, (which the presence of a king they had before been obliged to own and swear obedience to, give them a reasonable colour of concluding it did not), yet surely the Dissenters did not do anything to make them so; or to deserve worse at the hand’s of the Government than any other Protestants; but, on the contrary, it is more than probable that if they (I mean the Dissenters) had not put a stop to the career of the Irish army at Enniskillen and Londonderry, the settlement of the Government, both in England and Scotland, might not have proved so easy as it thereby did; for if that army had got to Scotland (as there was nothing at that time to have hindered them, but the bravery of those people, who were mostly Dissenters, and chargeable with no other crimes since; unless their close adhering to, and early appearing for the then Government, and the many faithful services they did their country, were crimes), I say (said he) if they had got to Scotland, when they had boats, barks, and all things else ready for their transportation, and a great many friends there in arms waiting only their coming to join them, it is easy to think what the consequence would have been to both these kingdoms: and these Dissenters then were thought fit for command, both civil and military, and were no less instrumental in contributing to the reducing the kingdom than any other Protestants: and to pass a Bill now to deprive them of their birthrights (for those, their good services), would surely be a most unkind return, and the worst reward ever granted to a people so deserving. Whatever the Papists may be sup-posed to have deserved, the Dissenters certainly stand as clean in the face of the present Government as any other people whatsoever: and if this is all the return they are like to get, it will be but a slender encouragement, if ever occasion should require, for others to pursue their example.

‘The great charter of Magna Charta provides that no man shall be disseized of his birthright, without committing some crime against the known laws of the land in which he is born or inhabits. And if there was no law in force, in the reign of King Charles II., against these things (as there certainly was not), and if the Roman Catholics of this kingdom have not since forfeited their right to the laws that then were in force (as for certain they have not); then with humble submission, all the aforesaid clauses and matters contained in this Bill, intituled *An Act to prevent the further growth of Popery, *are directly against the plain words and true intent and meaning of the said Articles, and a violation of the public faith and the laws made for their performance; and I therefore hope this honourable House will consider accordingly.’

I refer briefly to the arguments by which this reasoning was met. It was objected that the Counsel for the Catholics had not demonstrated how and when (since the, making of the Articles of Limerick) the Papists of Ireland had addressed the Queen or Government, when all other subjects were so doing; or had otherwise declared their fidelity and obedience to the Queen. Further it was urged, by way of reply, ‘That any right which the Papists pretended to be taken from theni by the Bill was in their own power to remedy, *by conforming, *as in prudence they ought to do; and that they ought not to blame any but themselves.’ It was still further argued that the passing of this Bill would not be a breach of the Treaty of Limerick, because the persons therein comprised were only to be put into the same state they were in in the reign of Charles II.; and because in that reign there was no law in force which hindered the passing of *any other law *thought needful for the future safety of the Government: lastly, that the House was of opinion that the passing of this Bill was needful at present for the security of the kingdom; and that there was not anything in the Articles of Limerick to prohibit them from so doing.

In the argument before the Lords it was admitted on the part of the petitioners, that the legislative power cannot be confined from altering and making such laws as shall be thought necessary, for securing the quiet and safety of the Governm emit; that in time of war or danger, or when there shall be just reason to suspect any ill designs to disturb the public peace, no articles or previous obligations shall tie up the hands of the legislators from providing for its safety, or bind the Government from disarming and securing any who may be reasonably suspected of favouring or corresponding with its enemies, or to be otherwise guilty of ill practices:- ‘Or, indeed, to enact any other law,’ said Sir Stephen Rice, ‘that may be absolutely needful for the safety and advantage of the public; such a law cannot be a breach of either of these, or any other like articles. But then such laws ought to be in general, and should not single out, or affect, any one particular part or party of the people, who gave no provocation to any such law, and whose conduct stood hitherto unimpeached, ever since the ratification of the aforesaid Articles of Limerick. To make any law that shall single any particular part of the people out from the rest, and take from them what by right of birth, and all the preceding laws of the land, had been confirmed to and entailed upon them, will be an apparent violation of the original institution of all right, and an ill precedent to any that hereafter might dislike either the present or any other settlement, which should be in their power to alter; the consequence of which is hard to imagine.’

The Lord Chancellor having then summed up all that offered at the Bar, the House of Lords proceeded to pass the Bill without delay. And it is really remarkable that in neither House did one single Peer or Commoner offer a word of remnonstrance against its passage. A few days after, on March 4, 1703, it received the Royal Assent. [Lords’ Jour., vol. ii. p. 87.]

Duhigg, in his ‘History of the King’s Inns,’ [’ History of King’s Inns, p. 259.] deals very hardly with Sir Richard Cox. He says, ‘Ormond had a worthy associate in Sir Richard Cox, who became an interested apostate from Irish Whiggism, and exerted official influence to emulate the courtly system of that day. The corrupt spirit of domestic faction seconded and extended English Toryism. To effectuate this important purpose, the new Chancellor claimed the exclusive patronage of the Queen’s Inns. Cox’s feelings suggested that the genius of self-interest governs mankind, whereby honour and virtue become victims to that grim idol. He conceived that the legal body would, therefore, anxiously follow and steadily support the distribution of professional favour, fortune, and honour. As no presumption exceeded his arrogance, neither was innocence or insignificance beneath the pressure of his malignity.’

The Session having concluded, his Excellency the Duke of Ormond left for England; whereon, on March 23, 1704, the Lord Chancellor was sworn as Lord Justice of Ireland, together with Hugh Earl of Mount Alexander, and Lieutenant-General Thomas Earl, During their government, in 1704, large drafts of troops went from Ireland to Portugal; and the Lord Chancellor exerted himself so ably to ensure the comfort of the soldiers during their voyage, he received a letter of thanks from the Earl of Gaiway, Corn mander of the Forces in Portugal.

The Duke of Ormond resumed his official duties in November 1704, arid the advancement of Irish manufac-tures again engaged the attention of the Lord Chancellor. He procured a measure to be passed, which allowed the Irish linen manufacturers to export their goods directly to the Colonies, then called the Plantations,

In the June following Sir Richard was again Lord Justice, with Lord Cutts, Commander of the Forces; and on June 27, 1705, he records in his autobiography, that the Privy Council dined with him at his house in Palmerstown.

Sir Richard resided at Palmerstown [This village, situated on the southern bank of the river Liffey, is said to derive its name from a venerable yew tree of great size, which for centuries cast its sheltering boughs, over the grass-grown graves in the old churchyard. The yew tree furnished the emblematic *palm *borne by Roman Catholics on Palm Sunday; but I think it more probable the place was called from some pious *palmer, *who in the time of the crusades endowed the hospital for lepers here, mentioned in Archdall’s Monasticon Hibernicum. The old church is supposed to be older than the English invasion. It consists of choir and nave connected by a semicircular arch of genuine Irish character. It is identical with that of O’Rourk’s tower, at Clonmacnois, the sides incline and the imposts are plain and square. The original doorway is also square-headed like the Irish doors, and situated in the centre of the west gable. Palmerstown House was long the seat of the Temple family ennobled by the title of Viscount Palmerstown. It now is a seat of the Earl of Donoughmore.] during the time he was Lord Chancellor.

In October 1706, the Lord Chancellor was created a Baronet, as a mark of Queen Anne’s favour, and in recognition of his great services. But the Ministry were then tottering, and rumours of the Duke of Ormond’s being changed as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland were afloat. The conduct pursued toward’s him made it appear as if the Ministry wished to cause him to resign. Appointments to high offices in Ireland were made without consulting him; and, when the Speaker of the Irish House of Commons repairea to London, where the Lord-Lieutenant then was staying, to present the Address to the Queen on the success of the troops, he was introduced by the Lord Treasurer, instead of the Lord-Lieutenant, by whom of right he should be presented. The Duke accepted the lame excuses of the Lord Treasurer, rather than gratify his enemies by resigning.

Meanwhile, a matter which caused some anxiety to the Lord Chancellor took place in Ireland, On January 26, 1706, his colleague as Lord Justice, Lord Cutts, died suddenly.

The Statute of 33 Henry VIII. required, ‘That the Chancellor should issue writs to the King’s Councillors in the shires of Dublin, Cork, Kerry, &c., to elect a Governor, upon the avoidance of every the King’s Lieutenant, Deputy, or Justice of the Realm, by death, surrender, or departure out of the Realm; and upon the election, that he should seal Letters Patent, and such person, being sworn, should have the like authority, pre-eminence, and dignity to every purpose and respect, as the King, Lieutenant, or Deputy then next before him used to have, &c., until the King do admit and authorize one to be his Lieutenant or Governor, and until he be sworn as accustomed.’

The morning.after Lord Cutts’ decease, the Lord Chancellor met the Privy Council at the Castle of Dublin, and requested their advice as to the course to be taken on the occasion. They expressed a unanimous opinion he should at once issue writs, and proceed to a new election; and, those more zealous for this course, declared their readiness to elect him sole Governor, as had been done a few years previously, when, on the death of Lord Capel, Sir Charles Porter, then Lord Chancellor, had been elected sole Lord Justice. But Sir Richard Cox felt doubts as to the propriety of this course. He could not, and would not trust men he knew capable of misleading him; and, in opposition to the Privy Council, declared ‘he could not, in the present case, proceed to an election, but must wait the ‘Queen’s nomination of New Justices - because, 1st, The Statute plainly related to *Head Governor *only, and the Lord-Lieutenant was Head Governor; for the Lords Justices, by their Patent, were to act by his instruction even after his departure. His authority was to continue by an express clause in their Patent; he signed all commissions of the army, and all. orders from the Queen were directed to him. 2nd, There was no * avoidance *of his (the Lord-Lieutenant’s) Commission by departure, for he was absent by license, and, therefore, not within the Statute. .3rd. The words *‘Until the King authorise a New Governor, and until he be sworn,’ *demonstrate that the Statute cannot operate when there is a Governor in being, authorised by the Queen, and sworn already; and, therefore, he concluded ‘that the Government was not *void *but *unsupplied.’ * He added, ‘That he thought it would be very dangerous, and of evil consequence, if he assumed a power not warranted by the Statute; but that no detriment could arise from deliberating and considering well what ought to be done; and since proceeding upon such writs would take up at least a fortnight, and that he might reasonably expect to know her Majesty’s pleasure within that time, having sent two expresses for the purpose, there was no reason to be precipitate.’ These arguments failed to satisfy the dissentients, and the Lord Chancellor accordingly care-fully consulted precedents, - one most in point was that of the Lord Deputy Wandesford, who died on December 3, 1640, when. the Lord-Lieutenant, the Earl of Strafford, was a prisoner in the Tower; and, though he was then in confinement, and the times perilous, they did not proceed to a new election, but used the words, ‘that the Government was *unsupplied.’ *

The Chancellor referred his reasons and precedents to the Judges and Law Officers, who, with one or two exceptions, agreed ‘that the Chancellor ought not to issue writs,’ The Queen, and all the legal authorities in England, held the Chancellor was right, but it obliged the Ministers to remove the Duke of Ormond. A Patent passed February 15, 1706, naming the Primate and Lord Chancellor Lords Justices.

On April 10, 1707, the Ministers waited on the Duke of Ormond, and, with many compliments for his past services, informed him the Queen desired to appoint another to relieve him of the charge he had so long administered, and had appointed the Earl of Pembroke in his room. The Lord Chancellor shortly afterwards received the like compliments, and a promise of compensation.

On June 30, Sir Richard delivered the Great Seal to the Lord-Lieutenant, who handed it to Chief Baron Freeman, appointed his successor. Sir Richard would have willingly retired to his estate in the county of Cork, but he was aware his enemies were preparing to attack him, and resolved to meet them face to face. This kept him in Dublin; and he had not long to wait before the attack was made. The House of Commons was the field selected, and the first ground of complaint was Sir Richard’s omission to elect a Lord Justice on the death of Lord Cutts. The House resolved, ‘1st. That by the death of Lord Cutts on January 26, 1706, the Kingdom became destitute of a Governor residing in the same until February 15 following. 2nd, That no writ was issued by Sir Richard Cox, Lord Chancellor, for electing a Justice, pursuant to the Statute of 33 Hen. VIII., from January 26 to February 15, 1706, at which time the Primate and Lord Chancellor were constituted Lords Justices under the Great Seal. 3rd. That it was and is the indispensable duty of the Lord Chancellor or Lord Keeper, when the Kingdom is destitute of a Lieutenant, Deputy, or other chief Governor, residing within this Kingdom, immediately to issue writs to summon the Privy Councillors to elect a chief Governor pursuant to the Statute of 33 Hen. VIII.’

As this course was against precedent, and the opinions of the Attorney and Solicitor-Generals of England, and ten of the Judges, and most eminent lawyers of Ireland, Sir Richard lost nothing in reputation by these resolutions of the Commons, and then the subject dropped. He employed his leisure in theological writings. In 1709, he published an ‘Address to the Roman Catholics in England,’ and wrote ‘An Enquiry into Religion, and the use of Reason in reference to it.’ When in London, in 1710, engaged about the publication of his works, the Lord Chancellor of’ Ireland, Mr. Freeman, was found to be mentally incapacitated for his office, and some Members of the Government observed that Sir Richard Cox should again hold the Irish Great Seal. This was not so arranged, but the Chief Justiceship of the Queen’s Bench was offered to, and accepted by him. In this important position he had to exercise all his prudence, for party-spirit ran very high, and there was extreme jealousy of those in authority. Sir Richard Cox was much esteemed by the Duke of Shrewsbury, Lord-Lieutenant at this time, a nobleman of high honour, integrity, amid candour.

By the death of Queen Anne on August 1, 1714, Sir Richard Cox and also Lord Chancellor Phipps lost their appointments. Cox retired to his country-seat, where he hoped to enjoy that repose which his years and labours so much needed; but the malice of his enemies disturbed his quiet. Parliament assembled November 12, 1715, and before long Sir Richard found that a long life passed in the service of his country, and the utmost zeal displayed for the advancement of the Protestant religion, were not sufficient to shield him from the charge of disloyalty to the throne and disregard for the interests of Protestantism. His conduct as a judge was impugned in the case of Mr. Dudley Moore; also for discharging one James Grimes without trial; and for not trying William Heydon and Patrick Erwin at Wexford during the Summer Assizes of 1714. But these charges fell to the ground on investigation, and could not be substantiated. Grimes, who was represented as being a dangerous traitor, proved to be a harmless fool. When the cases of Heydon and Erwin were called on at the Assizes of Wexford, where the Chief Justice presided, the Crown Council applied to the Chief Justice to postpone the trial to the next assizes, as the evidence was then insufficient to obtain a conviction, and they expected by that time to have further testimony; so it being clearly shown that the Crown caused the delay, this also failed. The charge against the Chief Justice respecting his conduct in Moore’s case sounded very alarming:

‘That the rule made by the Court of Queen’s Bench in the case of Dudley Moore, Esq., whereby the Clerk of the Crown was ordered to strike a jury for his trial, was unprecedented, arbitrary, and illegal, and a high invasion of the rights and liberties of the subject of Ireland. That Sir Richard Cox, late Lord Chief Justice of the said Court, by making such rule, acted partially, arbitrarily, illegally, and contrary to his oath and duty as a judge.’

This was a most serious charge to make against one who had filled such stations, and therefore we must care-fully see how it was answered.

Mr. Moore’s case was this:- The Irish Government had forbidden a prologue to be spoken at the Dublin Theatre on November 4, 1712, to the play of ‘Tamerlane.’ Mr. Moore, accompanied by one or two young gentlemen, in defiance of the Government, repeated the prologue on the stage in disregard of the entreaties and opposition of the actors. There was considerable disturbance on the occasion, and consequently the Government directed a prosecution for a riot against Moore and his associates, and they were accordingly indicted. The Queen, however, commanded a *noli prosequi *against all but Moore. Before proceeding to his trial, the Attorney-General stated ‘that the partiality of juries returned by sheriffs appeared lately in many instances, and he moved the Court that their officer be directed to strike an indifferent jury from the book of freeholders, returned by the Sheriff of Dublin, to try this issue between the Queen and the traverser, as was constantly done in like cases in England.’ This application was opposed, and after a very able argument, *curia advisam vuit. *Before giving judgment the Judges procured certificates as to the practice in England, and finding the practice and opinions of the Judges there in favour of the motion, the Irish Court of Queen’s Bench granted the application for the following reasons

‘I. Because the Common Law of England and Ireland is the same, and is preserved in Ireland by the jurisdiction which the Court of Queen’s Bench in England hath over that Court in Ireland.

‘II. This has been the constant practice of the Queen’s Bench in England for one hundred years past. It was done on the trial of the Seven Bishops, and was not complained of in the Bill of Rights.

‘III. The Queen’s Bench in Ireland has the power to make the rule, being the supreme, court of law of the kingdom. And there would be a failure of justice if the court did not exercise its power to order what is necessary to obtain fair trials.’

This was a complete answer to the charge of Sir Richard Cox acting illegally and contrary to his oath as a judge. He was also subjected to much obloquy on account of a Report of a Committee of the House of Commons concerning the election of Lord Mayors of Dublin, and the Committee reported ‘that Sir Richard Cox, late Lord Chief Justice of Ireland, being a member of the late Privy Council, and present when the Rolls and evidences of the city are produced at the Council Board, and having the perusal of these Rolls, acted partially and corruptly in making the said report, and thereby intended to impose on her late Majesty, and is guilty of high crimes and misdemeanours.

‘That it is the opinion of this Committee, removing the Lord Primate and Sir Constantine Phipps from the Government of the kingdom, dissolving the late Privy Council, and displacing the late Judges and Queen’s Counsel who signed the said Reports, was a seasonable instance of his Majesty’s justice and tender regard for the welfare and happiness of this kingdom.’

The contest respecting the appointment of Lord Mayor of Dublin began in 1709, and is related fully in Harris’s edition of Ware. [Vol. ii. p. 232.] Sir Richard Cox, as well as the other Judge, took no part whatever in this dispute, but the Report of the Attorney-General was referred to a Committee authorised to examine the matter, with power to call the Judges to their assistance, and to send for the books and charters of the city. The advice of the Judges was accordingly obtained. They very minutely investigated the matter from the reign of Henry III., and the Recorder of Dublin was so perfectly satisfied with Sir Richard Cox’s conduct, that he stated ‘that the Chief Justice intended no more on his part than to preserve the succession in the city, and thereby prevent tumults amid disorders usually attending contested elections.’ Conscious how little he deserved such treatment from the Irish Parliament, made him unwilling tamely to acquiesce in it; accordingly he proposed a statement of his long and important services to the Protestant and English interest in Ireland, and intended to claim an audience and present it to King George I. Before doing so he sought the advice of influential persons at Court, and they, probably considering his advanced age, and that be had had a fair share of places and emoluments during his career, dissuaded him from taking this step. One of them writing to him on November 7, 1716, recommended ‘he should now give over all thoughts of public business; because, in truth, any concern about that, or even a compensation for past services, would be vain, For there is so much fresh merit as yet unsatisfied that the old is grown very stale.’ [Life of Cox, Ware, vol. ii. p. 250.]

This hint showed that urging his claim would be futile, and with the good sense which guided his course through. life, he took it. He lived for the rest of his days in his country place - not in vain repining or listless idleness, but in works of improvement to his estate, in deeds of charity, and in study.

His figure was tall and well-proportioned, his features handsome, his manners pleasing and dignified. He was a staunch Protestant, but is open to the charge of bigotry and intolerance for the opinions he held, and the language be used, towards Roman Catholics and their Creed.

Many of his addresses to the Grand Juries are full of the most monstrous attacks upon the Catholic religion, and the most sacred of its tenets, Thus at the Summer Assizes at Kilkenny, July 1714, he said:- ‘So there can be no peace with Rome without swallowing all her superstitions and idolatries, and without believing that monstrous doctrine of transubstantiation, which everybody knows to be false, as certainly as he knows anything in. the world to be true.’ [Ibid. p. 251.]

Apart from this religious craze he was a very excellent man, and an able judge - better adapted, it would appear, for the Court of Chancery than those of Common Law; for as reason is the root of all law, he considered the Equity jurisdiction more consonant with reason than the proceedings in the Law Courts, which he regarded as fettered by precedents and rules of pleading. [The course of legislation and codification now in progress tends to efface any distinction between the systems of Law and Equity. Vide the able address of Lord Westbury at the Anniversary Meeting of the Juridical Society, London, March 30, 1870.] His decisions in Chancery were usually affirmed on appeal, the best proof of their soundness. Mr. Harris, alluding to the respect paid to the Chancellor’s judgments, says:- ‘In the great cause between Lady Kingsland and Mr. Barnwell, he gave judgment for the defendant. The lady upon her appeal was supported and favoured by the Minister and the greatest influence in England, yet, after a long hearing, his decree was confirmed unanimously in the fullest House that had been known on such an occasion, to the great honour of the Lords and the Chancellor, the pleasure of his friends, and the mortification of his enemies, who descended so low as to solicit against his decrees, not sparing to hurt his credit and reputation at the expense of the innocent suitors.’ [Harris’s Life of Cox, Ware, vol. ii. p. 251.] Sir Richard Cox was most exemplary in the various relations of life, as husband, father, master, friend. He was also an admirable *raconteur, *telling anecdotes with great humour, and esteemed a pleasant companion.

In the retirement of the country and the society of his family, he reached the ripe age of fourscore and three years, He died May 3, 1733, leaving a son who inherited the baronetcy as Sir Richard Cox, one daughter, and several grand-children.

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